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1. The construction of the European public sphere and the 
growing hostility towards the European project
The idea of Europe, from the Enlightenment onwards1, 
is defined by contrasts and different points of view. Con-
sequently, the formation of a European public sphere and 
of the ways in which the different organised groups, public 
and private, participate in the construction of its area of in-
fluence, has become a highly controversial issue. According 
to Jürgen Habermas2 the search for the roots of European 
identity should not be seen as the crucial question for the 
protection of the European project, since in his view de-
veloping a common sense of solidarity is more important. 
European identity will be achievable only when its com-
munity, vast and complexby definition, is finally capable of 
accepting its differences.
In 1993 Jacques Delors, in the “White Paper on Growth, 
Competitiveness and Employment,” estimated that in the 
following twenty years 80% of national decisions would 
be influenced by European institutions. Albeit not as 
quickly as predicted, and not in every sector, the proph-
ecy is coming true3. This is having a pronounced impact 
on the processes of governance, with repercussions – for 
better or worse – for the creation of European identity. 
1 M. Ceretta and B. Curli (eds.), On Europe. Discourses and Counter-
discourses, from the Enlightenment to the EU, London, Routledge, 2017.
2 J. Habermas, Cittadinanza politica e identità nazionale. Riflessioni 
sul futuro dell’Europa, in Morale, diritto, politica, Turin, Einaudi, 1992; 
Id., Il ruolo dell’intellettuale e la causa dell’Europa, Bari, Laterza, 2011.
3 S. Brouard, O. Costa and T. König (eds.), The Europeanization of 
Domestic Legislatures The Empirical Implications of the Delors’ Myth in 
Nine Countries, New York, Springer-Verlag, 2012.
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The definition of public space, which runs parallel to the 
formation and growth of democratic processes, is becom-
ing a multilevel interrelationship in which the European 
Union occupies an increasingly important role4. Suffice it 
to consider the role that the European institutions have 
played in mitigating the negative effects of the economic 
and financial crisis and the more current emergency of 
immigration from the Mediterranean area. This, however, 
means that the space in which European decisions are 
taken is no longer neutral and has become more and more 
conflictual. 
Some authors see the growth of constraining dissent 
within Europe as structural5 and consider the rise in critical 
positions as a sign that its public and political space and 
its civil society are maturing. They argue that since it is 
now possible to talk about a public sphere, the dynamics 
of conflict and forms of dispute are inevitable and their 
presence gives strength to the common project6.Within the 
public sphere, contentious politics become evidence of ro-
bust health and of the dynamism that always stimulates and 
accompanies the renewal of political and social phases, as 
Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow7 have explained. Seen from 
this perspective, the growth of Eurosceptic, or Euro-critical, 
feelings can even be a sign of vitality in the construction 
of the European project, although it remains difficult to 
ignore the risks, as the United Kingdom’s recent decision 
to withdraw from the European Union demonstrates.
4 I. Volkmer, The Global Public Sphere: Public Communication in 
the Age of Reflective Interdependence, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2014.
5 I. Down and C.J. Wilson, From Permissive Consensus to Constraining 
Dissensus: A Polarizing Union?, in «ActaPolitica», 43, 2008, pp. 26-49; 
L. Hooghe and G. Marks, A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Inte-
gration: From Permissive Consensus to CnstrainingDissensus, in «British 
Journal of Political Science», 39, 2009, pp. 1-23.
6 T. Risse and T. Börzel, Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe, 
in The Politics of Europeanisation, in K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli 
(eds), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 57-80.
7 C. Tilly, and S. Tarrow, Contentious Politics, Oxford, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2006.
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2. The precarious European public sphere
The public sphere is a communicative space of inter-
mediation where collective action and social relations ought 
to extend beyond those of the individual and facilitate new 
practices of citizenship8. From this point of view, constructing 
the European public sphere is proving more difficult than 
expected9. After years of permissive consensus10 and mostly 
uncritical acceptance of the European integration process by 
many member states, this favourable inclination is deteriorating 
due to the present crisis. The first intimation of this came in the 
early 1990s during the expansion of the European regulative 
sphere and the launch of a European system of governance 
when the Single European Act (1987) came into force and, 
more so, with the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) 
and the introduction of the single currency (1999).
All these factors have increased the evidence of a dem-
ocratic deficit, in other words the sense that the European 
Union and its institutions suffer from a lack of democratic 
legitimacy and an excess of complexity that creates a distance 
between them and citizens. The integration process is made 
fragile, vulnerable to anti-European attacks, by the inadequate 
sharing of information11 which gives rise to cognitive problems.
8 McKee 2005; R. Wodak and V.Koller (eds), Handbook of Commu-
nication in the Public Sphere, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2008.
9 R. Koopmans and P. Statham, The Making of a European Public 
Sphere: Media Discourse and Political Contention, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2010.
10 P. Bréchon, B. Cautres, and B. Denni, L’évolution des attitudes à 
l’égard de l’Europe, in Le vote des Douze. Les électionséuropéennes de 
juin 1994, P. Perrineau and C. Ysmal (eds.), Paris, Presses de Sciences, 
pp. 203-228.
11 P. Norris, Representation and the democratic deficit, in «European 
Journal of Political Research», n. 32, 1997, pp. 273-282; P. Golding, in 
Eurocrats, Technocrats and Democrats, in «European Societies», n. 9 [5], 
2007, pp. 719-734; A. Triandafyllidou, R. Wodak and M. Krzyzanowski 
(eds.), The European Public: Sphere and the Media Europe in Crisis, Lon-
don, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009; L. Morganti and L. Bekemans (eds), The 
European Public Sphere: From Critical Thinking to Responsible Action, 
Brussels, Peter Lang, 2012.
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In this perspective, globalisation12, multiculturalism and 
the pluralisation of the public sphere13 constitute the most 
serious challenges of the integration process. In terms of 
communicative action, these are challenges that raise the 
point of the multiplication of opportunities and arenas of 
discussion for European subjects as a development factor 
of European civil society.
In this respect the traditional media and the new 
media play a crucial role in defining the semantic field in 
which institutions, political forces and organised citizens 
form and reinforce their ideas. There is no doubt that the 
media and politics are currently contributing to a negative 
impression of Europe, even though there are indicators 
that seem more positive. This obliges us to distinguish 
between two apparent structural and cultural tendencies: 
the Europeanisation of the public sphere14 and the Euro-
peanised national public sphere15.
The Europeanisation of the public sphere is based on 
the understanding that a supranational dimension – not 
only economic and financial – is emerging in which 
Europe and its institutional actors take part in so far as 
they take political decisions and outline scenarios that 
are able to influence the public agenda of the Union16. 
This is a position firmly supported by European intel-
lectuals17, that has received institutional approval. The 
need for member states to reform their bureaucracies 
and update their policies is creating in practice a kind 
12 I. Volkmer, op. cit.
13 R. Marini, Concentrazione e distrazione: come i giornalismi nazionali 
rappresentano l’Unione Europea, in «Annali di Sociologia 2010-2012», 
18, 2015, pp. 197-219.
14 D. Della Porta and M. Caiani, Quale Europa? Europeizzazione, 
identità e conflitti, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2006. 
15 C. Marletti and J. Mouchon (eds), La costruzione mediatica dell’Eu-
ropa, Milan, Franco Angeli, 2005.
16 R. Ladrech, Europeanization and National Politics, Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, ch. 1.
17 J. Habermas, Il ruolo dell’intellettuale e la causa dell’Europa, cit.; 
E. Morin, Pénser l’Europe, Paris, Gallimard, 1987; A. Cavalli and A. 
Martinelli, La società Europea, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2016.
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of institutional isomorphism that draws them ever more 
closely together18.
Nevertheless, there still persists a tendency to speak of 
Europe in a way that connects its actions to domestic issues, 
to use the decisions of Brussels as a smokescreen behind 
which to hide internal problems19. Thus Europe becomes a 
scapegoat that provides national governments with excuses 
and justifications, particularly when adopting austerity meas-
ures that require sacrifice: «Europe demands it»20. 
Building on this theoretical picture, this essay investigates 
the Europeanisation process of the Italian public sphere, 
making use of findings of research on the visibility of the 
Union during elections, when the debate on Europe is at 
its most dense and political orientations emerge with clarity.
The aim is to analyse the presence of Europe as a social 
and political horizon and to reflect on how the media and 
communication systems either aid or hinder the construction 
of the European public sphere. The main hypothesis is that 
there is widespread disengagement and a lack of political 
professionalism in questions related to Europe, and that 
remains an obstacle to the development of a European 
common sense, leaving the field open to those with contrary 
inclinations.
3. Against Europe: the paradox of political discourse
It should be noted that in Italy a large sector of politics 
has long been strongly pro-European, first as a result of the 
18 C. Radaelli, The Politics of Corporate Taxation in the European 
Union: Knowledge and International Policy Agendas, London, Routledge, 
1997; Id., L’analisi di impatto della regolazione in prospettiva comparata 
[Editor], Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2001.
19 D. Della Porta and M. Caiani, op. cit.
20 P. Taggart, A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary 
Western European Party Systems, in «European Journal of Political Rese-
arch», 33, 1998, pp. 363-388; A. Cole and H. Drake, The Europeanization 
of the French polity: continuity, change and adaptation, in «Journal of 
European Public Policy», 7 [1], 2000, pp. 26-43.
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North Atlantic Treaty and then in response to perceived 
opportunities for globalisation and progress21. The Italians’ 
strong support for Europe can moreover be explained in 
terms of the country’s weak sense of national identity and 
thus its largely xenophile mentality22. Whatever the expla-
nation, things began to change with the new millennium. 
Aided and abetted by an unstable political and economic 
situation, a hesitant, incoherent Europeanism on the part 
of politicians and public opinion23 has marked the past 
twenty years.
But enthusiasm for Europe has been in decline almost 
everywhere since Italy’s entry into the Single Market and 
the introduction of the euro, and the global economic crisis 
has made things worse by strengthening the Eurosceptic 
front24. In spite of what the political debate seems to say, 
the situation is anything but clear.
Taking up the results of research by the University of 
Turin’s Observatory on Public and Political Communication, 
this chapter points to some indicators intended to explain 
the interpretative instability with regard to Europe.
Let us begin by outlining and analysing a long-term view 
of the situation obtained by crossing some data streams of 
attitudes towards Europe25. Over the past thirty years, the 
most significant in the history of European integration, two 
21 T. Ammendola and P. Isernia, L’Europa vista dagli italiani: i primi 
vent’anni, in M. Cotta, P. Isernia and L. Verzichelli (eds.), L’Europa in 
Italia: élite, opinione pubblica e decisioni, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2005, pp. 
117-170.
22 P. Segatti, Quale idea di nazione hanno gli italiani? Alcune riflessioni 
sull’idea italianadi nazione in una prospettiva comparata, in Giovani e 
democrazia in Europa, G. Bettin (ed.), Padova, Cedam, 2000, pp. 451-483.
23 F. Bindi, Italy and the European Union, Washington, Brookings 
Institution Press, 2011.
24 F. Serricchio, M. Tsakatika and L. Quaglia, Euroscepticism and the 
Global Financial Crisis, in «Journal of Common Market Studies», 51, 
1, 2013, pp. 51-64.
25 M. Belluati, Europa Liquida. Contraddizioni e ri-orientamenti del 
processo di costruzione della sfera pubblica in Italia, in L’Unione Europea 
tra istituzioni e opinione pubblica, M. Belluati and P. Caraffini (eds.), 
Rome, Carocci, 2015, pp. 179-192.
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crucial events have had to be confronted, namely the intro-
duction of the euro (1999) and the start of the economic 
crisis (2008). A comparison of the data reveals that the 
overall picture is rather complex. The proxy data chosen 
were: a) institutional trust in Europe26; b) the increased 
movement of citizens27 to show levels of internal mobility; c) 
the public visibility of news about Europe.28 In a descriptive 
sense the situation represented in this way appears more 
fluid and pronounced than might be suggested by public 
debate narratives.
The beginning of the century was characterised by the 
end of the phase of permissive consensus, that is, a period 
26 Following the model developed by Simon Hix (The Political System 
of the European Union, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), we have 
use the trend of responses to the Eurobarometro’s question: «Taking 
everything into consideration, would you say that [your country] has on 
balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?» 
available for Italy only until 2011.
27 Data on the Erasmus programme were chosen as indicators of 
European internal mobility.
28 The data are based on relevant reports in Italy’s main TV news 
bulletins (TG1).
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Figure 1. The phases of Europeanism in Italy
Source: Belluati 2015, p. 186.
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in which approval for the euro represented a superficial 
and fairly unproblematic attitude that coincided, in Italy, 
with the long wave of political instability, still unresolved, 
that allowed Euroscepticism to spread. During this time of 
uncertain trends in the data the situation was fluid. The 
economic crisis and the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
however, led to a new period characterised by the growth 
of a Euro-critical attitude, although judging by the ebbs and 
flows of the data this seems to have been more qualified for 
being better informed and more mobile29.
The political-electoral context serves as a vantage point 
from which to observe the trends of ongoing Europeani-
sation. From the 1990s onwards, the moment of definitive 
integration, attention paid to Europe in Italian elections has 
remained a constant. The first political programme to offi-
cially highlight the importance of the European Government 
in the heart of its manifesto was that of Romano Prodi in 
1996. From then on, to a greater or lesser degree, Europe 
has been part of the national political picture. Indeed, since 
2008 it has been a consistent and important aspect of the 
manifestos of all parties30, albeit with differences of orien-
tation. In this uncertain climate shared by opposing forces, 
many factors have contributed to guiding public debate on 
European issues.
The growing presence of Europe in public decisions and 
narratives is now self-evident, and to have an overall idea 
of this it was deemed useful to take elections as a point of 
reference. Data collected by the Observatory on Public and 
Political Communication have analysed an electoral cycle, 
focusing mainly on the past three European elections, of 
200431, 200932, and 201433 and the general election of 2013, 
29 F. Serricchio, Perché gli italiani diventano euroscettici, Pisa, Plus-
Pisa University Press, 2011.
30 F. Bindi, op. cit. 
31 C. Marletti and J. Mouchon (eds), op. cit.
32 M. Belluati and G. Bobba, European elections in Italian media: 
between second order campaign and the construction of a European public 
sphere, in «CEU Political Science Journal», 5[2], 2010, pp. 160-186.
33 M. Belluati, Europa Liquida, cit.; Id., Un’Europa, tante Europe, 
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in which Europe was important34.
An analysis of the European electoral cycle demonstrates 
that the public debate on European issues has been chang-
ing for some time, and that a process of transformation is 
taking place. Despite being less important35, the European 
elections of 2004 witnessed a growth of organised forms of 
political communication and increased media visibility. At 
that time, at least in Italy, the theme of anti-Europeanism 
went largely unnoticed by the national political system, 
whereas considerable attention was paid to the process of 
European integration and to relations with other member 
states. The quality and quantity of debate on European issues 
consolidated at that time have made it possible to verify the 
presence in Italy of a national public sphere increasingly 
Europeanised in terms of its agenda, which at the time was 
seen as a positive sign towards integration36.
However, the 2009 elections revealed more signs of 
change. On a political level, scant attention was paid to 
nessuna Europa, in «Comunicazione politica», “Meno Europa, altra 
Europa. La definizione dell’Europa in un frame controverso”, special 
issue [guest editor], XVI[3], 2015, pp. 289-298; Id., Elezioni Europee 
2014. Verso l’Europeizzazione dello spazio pubblico?, in «Lingue Culture 
Mediazioni – Languages Cultures Mediation», 2/2015, pp. 23-42; Id., 
Signs of Europeanization? The 2014 EU election in European newspapers, 
in «Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica», 
46, 2016, pp. 131-150; M. Belluati and C. Cepernich, 2017, Europe in 
the Media Space: The construction of the EU public sphere in Italy, in M. 
Ceretta and B. Curli (eds.), op. cit., pp. 189-214.
34 M. Belluati and F. Serricchio, Quale e quanta Europa in campagna 
elettorale e nel voto degli italiani, in ITANES, Voto amaro. Disincanto 
e crisi economica nelle elezioni del 2013, Bologna, il Mulino, 2013, pp. 
181-192.
35 The lesser importance of European elections is such that for a 
long time they have been considered true “second order elections” (K. 
Reif and H. Schmitt, Nine second-order national elections: A conceptual 
frame-work for the analysis of European election results, in «European 
Journal of Political Research», 8[1], 1980, pp. 3-45) inferior to general 
or presidential elections of the first level (S. Hix, op. cit.; S. Banducci, H. 
Boomgaarden, H. Semetko and C. De Vreese, 2006, The news coverage 
of the 2004 European Parliamentary Election Campaign in 25 countries, 
in «European Union Politics», 7[4], 2006, pp. 477-504.
36 C. Marletti and J. Mouchon (eds), op. cit.
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what was at stake in the election. Rather than concentrat-
ing on selecting a qualified leadership to send to Europe, 
the political parties turned the European elections into an 
opportunity for assessing the internal political balance37. 
On the other hand, the monitoring of the election coverage 
showed other results, primarily in the form of a continued 
rise in “European” news, and, secondly, of greater time 
and interest being dedicated to the electoral campaign by 
Brussels.
To counter the negative effects of the initial rejection of 
the Treaty of Lisbon by France and the Netherlands in 2005, 
and the risk of a repeat in Ireland in 2007, in the European 
elections of 2009 the organisation of electoral campaigns 
was, for the first time, not only left to the national parties, 
basically not very involved, but in addition the European Par-
liament’s Directorate-General for Communication developed 
a unified and supranational election campaign strategy. The 
election, then, saw the experimental use of pan-European 
political communication strategies and, although these did 
not have a very positive impact in 200938, they set in motion 
a process that was more successful in the 2014 elections, 
the first to be held after the Lisbon Treaty. The declared 
intention of this effort was to combat the growing trend of 
voter abstention that had strengthened the anti-European 
movements, identified as a serious problem for Europe.
The most institutionally important fact was that for 
the first time the groups of European parties were asked 
to choose a coalition leader who, in the event of victory, 
would become president of the European Commission. 
The national parties affiliated to the groups were asked 
to campaign individually, each on the behalf of its own 
leader.
37 Elections of secondary importance play a different function in 
relation to political goals, but are more useful for political evaluations of 
perspective, to measure popular sentiments and imagine possible scena-
rios (C. Lord and E. Harris, Democracy in the new Europe, Basingstoke, 
Palgrave/Macmillan, 2006; M. Belluati and G. Bobba, op. cit.). 
38 M. Belluati, Use your vote. La strategia d’informazione europea per 
le Elezioni 2009, in «Comunicazione politica», 11[1], 2010, pp. 81-87.
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In 2014 the organisation of institutional communication 
was coordinated by the European Parliament Download 
Centre, which planned news releases, produced campaign 
material in various languages, created adverts and promo-
tional posters, and organised the most important campaign 
events, including, for the first time, face-to-face TV debates 
between candidates for the presidency of the Commission. 
The bulk of the electoral investment was, however, concen-
trated on the social media, each country could make use 
of community managers and be supported by good web 
investment policies39.
Despite these efforts, the prominence of Eurosceptic 
political forces grew slightly in every country due in the 
main to the visibility of certain parties such the UK Inde-
pendence Party (UKIP), the French Front National (FN), 
and the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV). The phenomenon 
of Euroscepticism, recognised for some time by political 
science, became an overriding concern for the European 
institutions and a key theme of the media for the first time 
in 2014, notwithstanding the fact that the political constel-
lation of nationalist-populist movements against Europe is 
extremely diverse40.
Comparative research into the coverage of the 2014 
electoral campaign in six national newspapers in different 
countries has measured the ‘Euroscepticism Index’41.
As Table 1 shows, newspaper coverage of Euroscepticism 
was particularly high in the United Kingdom and France, 
39 R. De Marte, The European Institution on Social Media, in Com-
municating Europe in Italy. Shortcomings and opportunities, A. Maresi 
and L. D’Ambrosi (eds.), Macerata, Edizioni Università di Macerata, 
2013, pp. 119-131.
40 A. Martinelli, Mal di nazione. Contro la deriva populista, Milan, 
Egea, 2013. For a review of this argument I refer the reader to a se-
lection of references from a by now extensive literature: P. Taggart, op. 
cit.; A. Szczerbiak and P. Taggart, Opposing Europe? The Comparative 
Party Politics of Euroscepticism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008; 
Bellucci and Sanders 2011; F. Serricchio, Perché gli italiani diventano 
euroscettici, cit.
41 The Euroscepticism Index measures the visibility of Eurosceptic 
news and leaders (M. Belluati, Signs of Europeanization?, cit.).
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partly due to the presence of their main anti-European 
leaders, Nigel Farage and Marine Le Pen. However, despite 
a generally critical approach to Europe, an analysis of the 
reportage shows that the Eurosceptic front is not a politi-
cally cohesive bloc. Not only were the FN and UKIP not 
allies during the campaign, but there were even moments 
in which they disagreed on how to manage the immigration 
issue. In Germany, on the other hand, in spite of the fact 
that the Eurosceptic party Alternative für Deutschland won 
seven seats in the European Parliament, most references to 
Euroscepticism and its proponents in the press focused on 
the fear of Germany losing its leadership position in Europe.
In Italy, the newspapers have associated Eurosceptic 
arguments with the Movimento Cinque Stelle (M5S) more 
than the Lega Nord (LN), a political party openly allied with 
the FN. Towards the end of the campaign the leader of the 
M5S, Beppe Grillo, signed a pact with UKIP, but rather 
than being based on common aims the alliance appeared 
to have been pragmatic. In Spain, however, references to 
Euroscepticism were very low in number and the argument 
was utilised by Catalan independence parties in opposition 
to the pro-European parties in government. The criticism of 
Europe, while on the increase, does not appear particularly 
cohesive.
Finally, reference must be made to the Italian general 
elections of 2013, a decidedly more important event in the 
electoral cycle42. Another round of research conducted by 
42 G. Legnante, Il voto locale e la politica nazionale, in «Il Mulino», 
5, 2004, pp. 857-867.
taBle 1. Index of Euroscepticism in European newspapers during the campaign 
for the European parliamentary elections of 2014
La  
Stam-
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Monde
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Irish
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dian
Süd-
deutsche
Zeitungt
TOTAL
Euroscep-
ticism 
[Index]
0.38 0.32 0.64 0.49 0.75 0.59 0.47
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the Observatory on Public and Political Communication 
in Turin measured the increase of visibility and importance 
of Europe in the electoral debate43 due to the European 
institutions attempting to influence voters by openly en-
dorsing the candidacy of Mario Monti. The analysis of the 
interpretative frames of newspaper articles44 has helped to 
focus on the general structure of the debate on Europe. As 
Table 2 shows, in general during the electoral campaign the 
negative interpretative formulas – linked to accounts of the 
economic crisis and Germany’s excessive power – prevailed. 
More specifically, the European debate was deemed to be 
biased towards Mario Monti and against the centre-right 
leader Silvio Berlusconi. The election results, however, did 
not reward the position taken by the European Union, which 
43 M. Belluati and F. Serricchio, Quale e quanta Europa in campagna 
elettorale e nel voto degli italiani, cit.
44 E. Goffman, Frame Analysis. An Essay on the Organization of 
Experience, New York, Harper & Row, 1974; W.L. Bennett and R. Ent-
man (eds), Mediated Politics. Communication in the future of democracy, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Table 2. The Euro-frames of news articles during the Italian general election 
of 2013
Front page stories  
[Total: 163]
TV news reports  
[Total: 359]
General frame
Context of negative 
news 129 79% 199 55%
Negative effects of the 
economic crisis 55 34% 195 54%
Increase in German 
power 45 28% 38 11%
Strategic frame
European support for 
Monti 32 20% 16 4%
European opposition 
to Berlusconi 25 15% 0 0%
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have reinforced the Eurosceptic front and, paradoxically, 
also the Europeanisation of public sphere.
4. Conclusion
The conclusion we might reach after examining the 
public debate on Europe is that signs of Europeanisation are 
present, but are not always complete and linear. One sees 
efforts that confirm the rise of a European public space in 
which arguments and topics merge and influence the public 
agenda. On a general level, the European public sphere is 
more integrated than ever, but is still too small compared 
the force of anti-European arguments that prevail in public 
discourse and ultimately influence the widespread view. 
There are clear signs that populist anti-European positions 
in Italy are hardening because the national parties straddle 
the issue in the hope of garnering public support. On the 
other hand, it should be recognised that Brussels appears 
unable to deal effectively with the current trends.
Paradoxically, however, it should also be recognised that 
Euroscepticism may in itself be a form of the Europeanisation 
of public debate, a sign of the contentious politics that con-
firms the ongoing formation of the European public sphere. 
